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After entrepreneurs invest hard work, time, and ingenuity in their 
business, they may decide to sell the business to someone else. Before that 
sale, they likely know much more about the company than any prospective 
buyer. Consider, for example, the knowledge of the business’s conformity 
with tax law, the liability under contracts with suppliers, environmental 
regulatory risks, the financial statements’ GAAP2 compliance, and the 
owner’s authority to sell the company. One of the many transaction costs 
of the sale is the time and effort that the buyer will spend learning about 
the business. The buyer and seller can allocate this cost between 
themselves with the use of representations and warranties (“reps and 
warranties”) and with contractual remedies for breaches of these reps and 
warranties. Through reps and warranties, the seller can disclose 
information that she knows about the business and answer the buyer’s 
specific questions. Reps and warranties are more efficient than requiring 
the buyer to conduct an exhaustive investigation of every aspect of the 
business because they allow a seller to use her knowledge about the 
company.  
Normally, when the seller uses reps and warranties, she will 
promise to indemnify the buyer for any damages arising out of false reps 
and warranties. In a properly drafted agreement, the buyer only has a right 
to indemnity if the seller’s reps and warranties were untrue when they were 
made.3 A key topic of negotiation becomes how long the buyer will have 
to discover that one of the seller’s reps or warranties was false when made. 
In most private company agreements, this discovery period is referred to 
as the “survival” period. For example, a typical private Merger and 
Acquisitions (“M&A”) agreement might state: 
 
The Seller’s representations and warranties shall survive 
closing until eighteen (18) months after the closing date (the 
“Survival Period”). The Seller hereby indemnifies and holds 
Purchaser harmless from any losses, damages, costs, and 
expenses related to any breach of any of Seller’s 
representations or warranties in this agreement. [This 
indemnification provision] shall be the Purchaser’s sole 
remedy for any breach of the representations and warranties 
                                                   
1 The author would like to thank Professor Bob Reder at Vanderbilt for his helpful 
suggestions when writing this note. The author would also like to thank Jim McLaughlin at Maynard 
Cooper & Gale for his help in bringing topics discussed by this note to the author’s attention. 
2 Generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).  
3 Reps and warranties may be “made” either at signing or at closing depending on whether 
an agreement “brings down” reps and warranties to closing.  
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contained in this Agreement. Seller hereby disclaims any 
and all representations and warranties other than those 
expressly made under this Agreement. The Seller’s 
indemnification obligations shall terminate at the expiration 
of the Survival Period, except that any representation or 
warranty that would otherwise terminate in accordance with 
this paragraph will continue to survive if written notice of 
breach thereof is made in accordance with [the procedural 
notice provisions in the agreement].4 
 
To explain the mechanics of the provision above, first, a seller 
makes specific reps and warranties about the business. Next, the seller 
agrees to indemnify the buyer for any damages caused by an inaccuracy 
of the seller’s reps and warranties. Further, the buyer agrees that he has no 
other legal recourse for an inaccurate rep or warranty other than his right 
to indemnification from the seller. In addition, the seller will want to get 
“off the hook” after some period of time. Therefore, both (i) the right to 
indemnity, and (ii) the reps and warranties, are said to “survive” closing—
but only for a specific period. In the example above, that survival period 
is eighteen months. Lastly, the parties usually specify a notice procedure 
where the buyer agrees to notify the seller if he believes that he may have 
a claim to indemnification. This gives the seller a chance to fix the 
breached rep or warranty before a lawsuit is filed.  
A provision like the one above is very common. In M&A 
transactions, a seller will almost always make some reps and warranties to 
the buyer regarding the seller’s business.5 The seller is almost always in a 
better position to know about and to quantify risks, so buyers usually 
require the seller to stand behind at least some baseline facts about the 
business before he pays the seller. In practice, the fulsomeness of the 
seller’s reps and warranties depends on the bargaining power of the two 
parties. If the seller has great bargaining power, they can make the 
transaction more like an “as is” or “quitclaim” deal.6 If the seller has little 
bargaining power, they will have to indemnify the buyer for many risks 
associated with operating the business.7  
                                                   
4 This example is adapted from publicly available agreements like the Indemnification 
Agreement found at: The Chef’s Warehouse, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 6, 2015) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1517175/ 
000138713115001249/ex2-2.htm.  
5 See, e.g., 2011 Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study, 30 ABA 
PUBLISHING (2011) available at http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/events/AsiaMA/2012_ 
Day1_13.15.pdf (noting that only 3% of private M&A deals were silent as to the post-
closing survival of representations and warranties).  
6 An “as is” or “quitclaim” deal is a phrase modeled off of terms that originally arose in 
real estate wherein the seller made no representations about his or her claim to ownership over what 
was being sold. For further explanation, consider: Deed, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014).  
7 Impliedly, a “bad fact” must have existed when the rep and/or warranty about the bad fact 
was made.  
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In summary, reps, warranties, indemnification rights, and survival 
periods help the parties to pre-negotiate the seller’s post-closing liability 
for hard-to-quantify risks.8 Because indemnification is the buyer’s only 
remedy post-closing, when the right to indemnification cuts off, the seller 
knows that the proceeds she received in the sale are no longer at risk.9  
This “basket” of provisions (including reps, warranties, 
indemnification, and survival periods) might intersect with some state’s 
statutory provisions called “controlling statutes.” Controlling statutes 
prohibit a contractual shortening of the otherwise-applicable statute of 
limitations.10 This note argues that statutes prohibiting sophisticated 
business people from bargaining for a survival period should be repealed. 
In Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, the 
Supreme Court held that parties can contractually shorten an otherwise 
applicable statute of limitations.11 However, the Supreme Court left open 
the states’ ability to enact “controlling” statutes which explicitly ban 
                                                   
8 As a preliminary note, there is a fundamental—but confusing—difference between a 
contractual indemnification right in a M&A context and the common law, third party, theories of 
indemnity. The common law theory of indemnification accrues (i.e., the limitations period begins to 
run) when the “party seeking indemnification (indemnitee) has made payment to the third party” and 
the payer has a subsequent legal right to seek compensation from a person who was not a party to the 
first suit (the indemnitor). See Certainteed Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 217032 at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 24, 2005). Conversely, the contractual indemnification in the M&A setting accrues at closing 
when the buyer (indemnitee) receives something different from what the seller (indemnitor) 
represented the buyer would receive. Id. The difference is important because a plaintiff in the M&A 
setting cannot argue that his claim did not accrue until some third party (perhaps the EPA in an 
environmental regulatory action) made a final determination of liability. Rather, the seller breached 
and the period of limitation began at closing even if the plaintiff was unaware of the defect. The only 
exception would be if there were some external “tolling” rule that paused the statute of limitation such 
as: fraudulent concealment, inherently unknowable injuries, and equitable tolling. See, e.g., id. 
(discussing the “inherently undiscoverable” doctrine where, even after a reasonable investigation, a 
party could not have discovered that a representation was false). The tolling doctrines are very difficult 
for a plaintiff to plead and would not be applicable to most M&A transactions. See Marshall T. 
Simpson Tr. v. Invicta Networks, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172247, at *20 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2017) 
(pointing out that to plead the “inherently unknowable” injury requires that the plaintiff show that it 
would have been “practically impossible” to discover a misrepresentation and even if a tolling rule 
applies, it will not toll the statute of limitations after the plaintiff is put on inquiry notice). The “tolling” 
exceptions are largely outside of the purview of this note. For further helpful discussion of the 
distinction, see generally Melissa DiVincenzo, Repose vs. Freedom – Delaware’s Prohibition on 
Extending the Statute of Limitations by Contract: What Practitioners Should Know, 12 DEL. L. REV 
29, 36 (2010). 
9 See 2011 Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study, 30 ABA PUBLISHING 
(2011) available at http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/events/AsiaMA/2012_Day1_ 
13.15.pdf (noting that 3% were silent as to the survival period, 1% had survival periods of 
less than 6 months, 25% had survival periods of 12 months, 14% had survival periods of 12–18 
months, 34% had survival periods of 18 months, 2% had survival periods of 18–24 months, 12% had 
survival periods of 25 months, and 4% had survival periods of greater than 24 months). 
10 See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947). 
11 See id. (“[I]t is well established that, in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, 
a provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an action on such 
contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided that the 
shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period.”)  
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contracts that shorten the applicable statute of limitations on public policy 
grounds.12  
This note argues that, while states may enact controlling statutes, 
they should not because such statutes (i) inefficiently limit the tools that 
parties have to allocate risk and (ii) create a lack of national uniformity.13 
This note will show that there are nine states with laws that could 
invalidate important provisions in 94 percent of M&A agreements. These 
laws should be repealed. Secondarily, this note will seek to explain and 
clarify the complicated web of rules related to this topic. Part of this 
explanation will involve an argument that the contractual survival period 
is logically distinct from common law suits over breached reps and 
warranties. This distinction makes it inappropriate to argue that the statute 
of limitations can step in to extend the time period that a buyer has to sue 
a seller beyond the survival period.  
Imagine that the previously mentioned entrepreneur (Sally, for the 
sake of this example) has grown a small chain of gas stations in Alabama, 
and Sally now wants to retire to her family farm. Sally identifies an 
interested buyer, Bob. Bob is an aggressive bidder, but he is concerned 
about a potential Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) violation 
from gasoline runoff at one of the gas station properties. Sally does not 
think that the gasoline leak is a serious problem, but to assuage Bob’s 
fears, she makes a specific representation that, as of the deal closing, there 
are no EPA violations on the gas stations’ property sufficient to have a 
material adverse effect on the company. Bob likes this idea because it acts 
as an insurance policy from Sally against the hard-to-quantify risk that the 
property is currently violating EPA regulations.  
Sally, eager to sign a deal, decides to grant Bob a right of 
indemnification, and she gives Bob a choice. Bob can accept a two-year 
right of indemnification at his current bid price ($1,000,000), or he can get 
a three-year indemnification right by raising his bid to $1,100,000. This 
means that in the event that Bob can prove, within the survival period, that 
Sally’s EPA representation was false when it was made, then Sally has to 
compensate Bob for any damages he incurred in relying upon her 
representation. In other words, Sally might be paying the EPA to fix the 
problem. The period that Bob has to discover that a representation was 
false (when made) is the “survival” period.  
Bob is satisfied, and he takes the two-year indemnification right 
because he thinks that if there is a problem, surely, he will be able to 
discover it in two years. The deal closes, and two years pass. During the 
third year, Bob is appalled when he gets notice from the EPA that one of 
the gas stations has been leaking fuel into a river for the past ten years. 
Bob decides to consult his attorney. Bob remembers that he only got an 
                                                   
12 Id. 
13 See infra part III.B. (discussing the importance of repealing both borrowing statutes and 
controlling statutes).  
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indemnification right for two years because he was not willing to pay the 
extra $100,000, so Bob fears that his attorney will say that he is out of 
luck.  
Fortunately for Bob, his attorney just got back from his CLE credit 
where he saw a presentation about states, including Alabama, which 
statutorily prohibit contractual shortening of the applicable statute of 
limitations.14 The presentation warned practitioners that there are at least 
nine states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota) that have “controlling 
statutes” prohibiting “contractual shortening” of the statute of 
limitations.15 Thus, Bob’s lawyer advises Bob to sue Sally three-years after 
closing even though Bob did not pay the extra $100,000. The attorney 
advises Bob to argue that Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations for 
actions upon a contract is the actual time period that Bob had to discover 
that Sally’s representation was false. Bob’s lawyer advises him to make 
this argument notwithstanding the fact that Bob and Sally specifically 
bargained over the survival period.16  
Buyer-Bob’s argument is the exact argument that was made in 
Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Wynn Dewsnup Revocable Trust 
(“Dewsnup”) which involved the sale of 5,487 acres of land in Idaho (the 
“Property”) for $15,300,000 by means of a Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement (“PSA”).17 Dewsnup turned, in large part, on Idaho’s 
controlling statute, Idaho Code § 29-110, which states that “[e]very 
stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any party thereto is 
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho tribunals, 
or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is 
void as against the public policy of Idaho.” (the “Idaho Controlling 
Statute”).18 
In Dewsnup, the buyer discovered, post-closing, that sodium 
levels on the Property were too high for irrigation use—a fact which 
                                                   
14 See ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (2017) (“[A]ny agreement . . . whereby the time for the 
commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the 
commencement of such action is void.”); Paul Klug, Mergers and Acquisitions: Survival Period 
Shorter Than Applicable Statute of Limitations-Enforceable? ASSO’C OF CORP. COUNSEL-ST. LOUIS 




Presentation-090914.PPTX&usg=AOvVaw3i_97Hel0Uqb1oggarfIT5 (explaining how controlling 
statutes may invalidate contractual survival periods).  
15 Id.  
16 See ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (1940) (setting a six-year period).  
17 Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Wynn Dewsnup Revocable Trust, 996 F. Supp. 
2d 1026, 1029 (D. Idaho 2014). 
18 IDAHO CODE § 29-110.  
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“preclude[ed] normal agricultural activities on the property.”19 The utility 
of the property for agricultural purposes was expressly addressed in the 
PSA because the seller represented that the Property “has access to water 
resources necessary in the operation of agricultural activities” (the “Water 
Rep”).20 
The PSA also provided that the Water Rep “shall survive the 
Closing . . . of this Agreement for a period of one (1) year.”21 The buyer 
discovered the elevated sodium levels and notified the seller that the Water 
Rep was breached before the one-year survival period ended, but the buyer 
did not file suit within the one-year period.22 When the buyer filed suit, the 
seller argued that (i) notice of the breached Water Rep was insufficient and 
that the seller must file suit before the survival period ended and (ii) the 
Idaho Controlling Statute barred any contractual limitations period shorter 
than five years.23 Specifically, according to the buyer, Idaho’s statute of 
limitations for breach of contract was five years, and thus, the PSA’s 
survival period of one year was void because it violated the Idaho 
Controlling Statute since the PSA purported to “limi[t] the time within 
which [the buyer] may thus enforce his rights.” 24 
The court began its analysis by noting that “Idaho has expressed a 
fundamental policy by requiring strict adherence to its statutory limitations 
period.”25 The court held, for reasons discussed in Section II.C. of this 
note, that the PSA did not require the buyer to file suit within one year. 
However, before reaching this holding, the court wrote in dicta that “a one-
year limitation on [the buyer’s] lawsuit is tantamount to [a void agreement] 
under Idaho law.”26 Therefore, it appears that, at least under Idaho law, 
(and potentially the law of any other state with a similar controlling 
statute) parties cannot set survival periods of less than the otherwise 
applicable statute of limitations.27 
This note will examine the variables that effect the way that courts 
may limit parties’ contractual freedom to shorten or lengthen statutes of 
limitation. It will describe the legal levers that determine the applicable 
survival period and suggest ways that parties can reduce legal uncertainty 
around the “basket” of provisions including reps, warranties, survival, and 
indemnification periods. One key detail examined by this note is 
                                                   
19 Dewsnup, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.  
20 Id. at 1030. 
21 Id. at 1031.  
22 Id. at 1033.  
23 Id.  
24 IDAHO CODE § 29-110 (2012) (the Idaho Controlling Statute); IDAHO CODE § 5-216 
(1939) (the five-year Idaho statute of limitations for breach of contract).  
25 Dewsnup, 996 F. Supp. at 1034.  
26 Id. at 1036.  
27 For another example, consider similar laws in Tennessee. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
2-725 (1985) (providing that the parties may reduce the period of limitation for action on a contract in 
sale from four years to “not less than one year: it may not be extended”); Curtis v. Murphy Elevator 
Co., 407 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding that attempts to disclaim or limit warranties of 
merchantability to less than one year would be invalid).  
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“borrowing statutes” that could operate to import another state’s 
controlling statute. Additionally, this note will discuss ways in which the 
contractual right to indemnification for breached reps and warranties is a 
substantive right that is inextricably tied up with the duration of the right 
in such a way that statutes of limitation should not be implicated. 
Specifically, this note will argue that a contractual indemnification and the 
concomitant survival period is distinct from the common law right to sue 
for misrepresentation. This distinction makes it illogical for courts to 
invalidate bargained-for survival periods on the grounds that they violate 
the statute of limitations.  
I. BACKGROUND 
In the modern private M&A context, every transaction involving 
the sale of a company is governed by some form of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement. One of the perennial, and highly negotiated, sections of this 
agreement is the reps and warranties section where the seller described 
what she is selling. The scope and detail of the seller’s representations in 
the agreement will vary based upon the seller’s relative bargaining 
position, with a more powerful seller able to make very few 
representations about her business and thus shift due diligence costs to the 
buyer.28 Therefore, when a high-powered seller (who makes few reps and 
warranties) sells a company, it is more of a “caveat emptor” transaction.29 
The seller wants to limit reps and warranties because each rep or warranty 
about the company is an opportunity for the buyer to push risks back to 
the seller if a latent defect is discovered post-closing. 30 
With this buyer-seller tradeoff in mind, the reps and warranties 
section has four main business purposes: (i) for the seller to consolidate 
and disclose known information relevant to the buyer’s decision to 
purchase the company, (ii) to allocate risk between the parties pertaining 
to negative facts that may not be known to either party at the time of sale,31 
(iii) to provide the buyer with a “walk right,”32 or the ability to not 
purchase the company if the buyer discovers, before closing, that the seller 
                                                   
28 To explain this tradeoff, usually only sellers who have a strong bargaining position can 
ask a buyer to take an asset “as is.” 
29 Here, “caveat emptor” meaning buyer beware, signifies the strongest kind of seller. 
These sellers can sell a metaphorical black box. The buyer will get whatever is in the black box, but 
the seller has not promised that the black box will contain anything or perform in any specific way.  
30 See 21st National M&A Institute, Annual Nat’l Inst. On Negotiating Bus. Acquisitions: 
Model Stock Purchase Agreement with Commentary Second Edition 20, AMERICAN BAR  
ASS’N (2017), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/cle/201
6/11/ce1611nba/ce1611nbacor.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that the “[s]cope of representations in an 
acquisition agreement will vary based upon factors such as the nature of the target’s business, the 
relative bargaining power of the parties, the business context, and the size of the transaction.”). 
31 See id. at 30 (providing examples of whether the company’s products infringe on any 
third-party patents or whether pending litigation will materially affect the company).  
32 This “walk right” is only effectively operative if the specific rep and warranty is a closing 
condition.  
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breached a rep or warranty, and (iv)—in tandem with the indemnification 
and survival provisions—to allow the seller to define her post-closing risk 
by defining the buyer’s only legal remedies if any of the reps and 
warranties turn out to have been breached (i.e., been false) as of the 
closing.33 While all goals are relevant to this note, the second and the 
fourth goals (to allocate risks pertaining to unknown facts and to allow the 
seller to define her post-closing risk) are the most important.  
For U.S. transactions in 2015, 82% of Purchase and Sale 
Agreements provided that the buyer’s right to indemnification for 
breached reps and warranties would survive for at least 18 months after 
closing.34 Depending on the parties’ relative bargaining power, the 
survival period could terminate immediately post-closing or extend past 
five years in some contracts—especially in dealing with so-called 
“fundamental” reps and warranties.35 The graph below shows a more 
detailed look at the survival periods for non-fundamental reps and 
warranties for deals that closed in 2012.  
 
                                                   
33 Id. 
34Zachary D. Detra & Andrew I. Sultan, What's Market? ABA 2015 Private Target Deal 
Points Study: Selected Highlights, DAVIS, GRAHAM & STUBBS (Jan 27, 2016), 
https://www.dgslaw.com/news-events/whats-market-aba-2015-private-target-deal-points-study-
selected-highlights. 
35 See Nixon Peabody, Mergers and Acquisitions Key Findings from 2017 Survey of M&A 
Indemnification Deal Terms, 31 INSIGHTS 12 at 19 (Dec. 2017) https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-
/media/Files/PDF-Others/indemnification-deal-terms-survey-findings-insights.ashx?la=en .  




Some reps and warranties are “fundamental” and have a longer 
survival periods of three to five years—depending on negotiation.37 Some 
common examples of “fundamental” reps and warranties include: the 
seller’s organization and standing, the proper payment of brokers and 
finders fees, title to assets or securities, tax liability, and GAAP 
compliance of financial statements.38 The chart below shows the 
percentage of deals that “carved out” specific reps and warranties (to 
become “fundamental” reps and warranties). Frequently, these reps and 
warranties are subject to a longer survival period because they are more 
important to the buyer.39 
                                                   
36 21st National M&A Institute, Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points 
Study 86, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (2016) (Containing deals that closed in 2012) (hereinafter “2012 
ABA Study”), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/events/cle/2016/11/ce1611nba/ce1611nbacor.authcheckdam.pdf. 
37 See Jon Seibers, fundamental representations and warranties, RHOADESMCKEE.COM,  
https://www.rhoadesmckee.com/fundamental-representations-warranties-survival-
periods-caps/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2018); Jon Seibers, what are the differences between  
qualified and unqualified representations and warranties?, RHOADESMCKEE.COM,  
https://www.rhoadesmckee.com/qualified-vs-unqualified-representations-warranties/ (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
38 See id. 
39 See Fortis Insight: Survival Periods for Representations and Warranties, FORTIS 
ADVISORS (June 22, 2016), https://www.fortisrep.com/news/2016/6/28/fortis-insight-survival-
periods-for-representations-and-warranties. 
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40 
These two graphs are important because, as this note will show, 
controlling statutes threaten to invalidate a large percentage of survival 
clauses. Controlling statutes prohibiting contractual shortening of the 
statute of limitations are currently enacted in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Idaho and 
South Dakota.41 Based on the data above and cases like Dewsnup,42 these 
statutes could invalidate at least 94% of all non-fundamental survival 
clauses in M&A agreements.43 It is unclear how aware practitioners in the 
M&A space are of the interaction between survival periods and controlling 
statutes. 
                                                   
40 See 2012 ABA Study, supra note 36, at 87.  
41 See ALA. CODE. § 6-2-34 (1940) (six years); FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2018) (five years); LA. 
CIV. CODE § 3499 (1984) (ten years); MISS. CODE § 15-1-49 (1990) (three years); MO. REV. STAT. § 
516.120(1) (1939) (five years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-201(1) (2001) (eight years); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 12 § 95 (five years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (2001) (three years); IDAHO CODE § 29-110 
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-6 (1949) (six years). 
42 See supra Introduction. 
43 See Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Wynn Dewsnup Revocable Trust, 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 1026, 1029 (D. Idaho 2014). To understand this point, note that the vast majority of survival 
periods in M&A agreements are shorter than two years. See 2012 ABA Study, supra note 36, at 87. 
Therefore, any of these agreements (if they are governed by the law of a state with a controlling statute) 
purport to limit the limitations period because the statute of limitation in most of these states is greater 
than two years. Id. 
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To further complicate the issue, this note will show that it is the 
state where a Purchase Agreement arises that will determine the source of 
law for procedural matters. Therefore, parties cannot simply contract 
around a controlling statute by providing that the agreement will be 
governed by the law of another state.44 Part of this note’s intention is to 
increase awareness of the general operation of the statute of limitations 
rules and to give practitioners some tips on how to avoid unexpected 
consequences. 
One of the most important state laws related to this topic is in 
Delaware, because of its centrality to M&A deals. In 2014, Delaware 
amended its statute of limitations to expressly allow parties to set 
contractual statutes of limitations for agreements involving at least 
$100,000, as long as the time period set by the agreement is less than or 
equal to twenty years.45 This would seem to eliminate any doubt that a 
survival period of zero to twenty years is valid. Unfortunately, other states 
have not been so quick to explicitly accommodate bargained-for risk 
allocation choices and may, in fact, statutorily prohibit contractual 
shortening of the “applicable” statute of limitation.46 This means that, for 
example, a court applying the South Carolina Statute of Limitations for 
action upon a contract (three years) could arguably invalidate the vast 
majority of contractual survival clauses (usually less than two years).  
To further illustrate why survival clauses are at risk, note that 
South Carolina prohibits contractual shortening of the limitations period.47 
However, most agreements provide that the right to indemnity for 
breached reps and warranties survives for only eighteen months.48 
                                                   
44 See infra Part II.B. 
45 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8106 (West 2014); Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Trust 
2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *37 (Ch. Jan. 12, 2015) (stating that 
Section 8106 was “intended to allow parties to contract around Delaware’s otherwise applicable statute 
of limitations for certain actions based on a written contract, agreement or undertaking”).  
46 As examples, South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, and Missouri all have “controlling 
statutes” which prohibit contractual shortening of the statute of limitations. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-
140 (2012) (“No . . . agreement in any contract of whatsoever nature, verbal or written, whereby it is 
agreed that either party shall be barred from bringing suit upon any cause of action arising out of the 
contract if not brought within a period less than the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, for 
similar causes of action, shall bar such action, but the action may be brought notwithstanding such 
clause . . . .”); ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (2017) (“[A]ny agreement … whereby the time for the 
commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the 
commencement of such action is void”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.03 (2013) (“Any provision in a contract 
fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less 
than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 431030 (2015) 
(“All parts of any contract . . . which either directly or indirectly limit or tend to limit the time in which 
any suit or action may be instituted, shall be null and void.”).  
47 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 (2012).  
48 See 2012 ABA Study, supra note 36 (showing that the vast majority of M&A deals had 
a survival period of at least 18 months); S.C. CODE ANN. §15-3-530 (2012) (setting the statute of 
limitations for an action upon a contract at three years); S.C. CODE ANN. §15-3-140 (2012) (prohibiting 
contractual shortening of the statute of limitations).  
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Therefore, because eighteen months is shorter than three years, most 
survival periods ostensibly “bar[] [a party] from bringing suit upon any 
cause of action arising out of the contract if not brought within a period 
less than the time prescribed by the statute of limitations.”49 
While the parties to a Purchase and Sale agreement will remain 
free to simply select Delaware law to substantively govern their 
agreement,50 it may be the forum selection clause which actually 
determines the applicable statute of limitations because the statute of 
limitations is a procedural law for purposes of the Erie doctrine, at least 
in Delaware.51 This note will explain the risk that if the parties are either 
(a) litigating in a forum that prohibits a contractual modification of the 
statute of limitations or (b) litigating in Delaware, but the case “arose” in 
a forum that prohibits contractual modification, the parties’ attempt to 
contractually modify the statute of limitations with the use of a survival 
clause could be void.  
To explain this risk, it is important to understand the Delaware 
Statute of Limitations with an eye towards (i) the operation of Delaware 
procedural law and (ii) the operation of key contractual clauses related to 
the survival period.  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Operation of the Delaware Statute  
The Delaware statute of limitations, as amended in 2014, sets a 
three-year statute of limitations, but if the agreement involves at least 
$100,000, then it may be brought as “specified” in the written contract 
with a maximum limit of twenty years.52 This statute has been described 
by courts as setting a “contractarian” statute of limitations, but there are 
still some unclear, or at least confusing, areas of the law.53 Specifically, 
what will determine the source of law for the limitations period, what 
language must the parties use to specify the limitation period; when does 
the limitation period begin to run; what must a plaintiff do to satisfy the 
limitation period; what effect does a notice requirement have on the 
limitations period; what effect do choice of law provisions have; and can 
the statute of limitations be lengthened contractually? These questions are 
important to explain ways to reduce risk in this area of law, and these 
                                                   
49 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 (2012). 
50 See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (explaining that the internal 
affairs doctrine is only relevant to disputes between owners and officers of a corporation which would 
not control disputes between a former and current owner).  
51 See infra note 55 (discussing Delaware cases that show that the statute of limitations is 
a procedural law and not a substantive law that would be governed by a choice of law provision).  
52 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8106 (West 2014); see also GRT, Inc. v. Marathon GTF Tech., 
Ltd., 2011 WL 2682898, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2011) (noting that “parties to a contract are entitled 
to shorten the period of time in which a claim for breach may be brought, i.e., the statute of limitations, 
so long as the agreed upon time period is a reasonable one.”)  
53 See Certainteed Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 217032 at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005) 
(describing the “contractarian” rule and basing its analysis of “representations and warranties” as a 
breach of contract claim, not a breach of warranty claim, under Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10 § 8106).  
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topics will be addressed before moving to contractual, legislative, and 
judicial suggestions. 
B. Determining the Applicable Limitations Period 
The traditional rule, adopted by Delaware, treats the statute of 
limitations as a procedural law.54 Thus, it is the forum selection clause and 
not the choice of law provision that will determine whether the Delaware 
contractual statute of limitations will apply.55 This procedural and 
substantive distinction can be overlooked which could have expensive 
consequences if an agreement’s forum selection clause chose a jurisdiction 
that did not respect bargained-for limitation periods.56 One might think 
that selecting Delaware in the forum selection clause would guarantee that 
a court would apply the Delaware “contractarian” statute of limitations.57 
Unfortunately, even if both the forum selection clause and the choice of 
law provision select Delaware law, the purchase agreement might still be 
limited by another jurisdiction’s “controlling statute,” at least if the 
agreement arose outside of Delaware.  
This additional wrinkle comes from Delaware’s “borrowing 
statute” which requires that, if a cause of action “arises” outside of 
                                                   
54 See infra note 55.  
55 See Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Tr. 2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 9, at *38 (Ch. Jan. 12, 2015) (“Delaware precedent explains that a modification of a limitations 
period is a procedural matter affecting remedies rather than a change in substantive law.”); Aircraft 
Service International v. TBI Overseas Holdings, 2014 WL 4101660 *2–*3 (Del. Super. Ct.  Aug. 5, 
2014) (applying, without a detailed analysis, the Delaware “contractual limitations” period to an 
agreement for which New York law was “the choice of law made by the agreement”); Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 866 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2005) (applying an analysis of Delaware 
procedural law to an agreement that was governed by Saudi Arabian substantive law). Other states 
such as New York have similar approaches, concluding that a choice of law provision will not control 
the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Res Cap Liquidating Trust Mortg. Purchase Litig. v. 
HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 524 B.R. 563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“A choice of law provision in a 
contract generally does not govern the applicable statute of limitations to a cause of action arising out 
of that contract.”) (citing Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. King., 927 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (N.Y. 
2010)) ("Choice of law provisions typically apply only to substantive issues, and statutes of limitations 
are considered procedural because they are deemed as pertaining to the remedy rather than the right.")). 
56 See, e.g., Simon Romano & Andrew S. Cunningham, Survival Clauses and Limitations 
Law in Delaware and Ontario: A Quick Comparison LEXOLOGY (May 14, 2014) 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=780f0942-e0a6-4fa2-96a7-3e7c3308af61. Online 
legal blogs occasionally suggest using a “choice of law” provision selecting a jurisdiction for its 
statute of limitations without analyzing whether the forum selected would honor that statute or 
disregard it as procedural. Id. 
57 As an example, Bridge Products v. Quantum Chemical, parties specified that Delaware’s 
substantive law would govern their agreement, but the forum court, sitting in Illinois, applied the 
Illinois procedural law to determine the appropriate statute of limitations. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2202, 
at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1990) (applying a forum state’s procedural law instead of Delaware’s statute 
of limitation notwithstanding that the agreement specified “[t]his Agreement shall be executed, 
construed and performed in accordance with Delaware Law.”) In turn, Illinois procedural law used a 
“most significant relationship” test pursuant to its borrowing statute to determine that Illinois 
procedural law would “borrow” the Virginia statute of limitations for the instant case because the 
cause of action arose in Virginia based off of the agreement’s place of performance of promises and 
the subject matter of the agreement. Id. 
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Delaware, courts must use the shorter of: (i) the statute of limitations in 
the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose or (ii) the Delaware statute 
of limitations.58 Thus, even if a party is litigating in Delaware, the 
Delaware procedural law may be forced to adopt or borrow another state’s 
procedural law if the claim arose in a state other than Delaware.59  
The flow chart below shows the potential interaction of forum 
selection and the “borrowing” statute, at least under the plain language of 
the borrowing statute.60 Borrowing statutes give rise to two distinct 
implications. First, the forum court’s procedural law will apply. This 
means that the forum court’s stance towards shortening or lengthening the 
statute of limitations is the relevant source of law, potentially including 
any “controlling” statute that limits parties’ ability to shorten the statute. 
Second, the borrowing statute may require that a different forum’s statute 
of limitation govern. 
 
To further complicate the matter, Delaware courts have not always 
constructed the borrowing statute according to its ordinary meaning. Some 
                                                   
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8121 (West 1953). 
59 Id. 
60 It is unclear whether the borrowing statute would compare the statute of limitations as 
contractually shortened under § 8106 or the default three-year period under § 8106. For the purposes 
of this flow chart, it is assumed that the contractual period is the relevant period for comparison with 
the foreign jurisdiction’s period.  
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Delaware courts have applied a purposivist reading61 to the borrowing 
statute. These purposivist readings refuse to “borrow” another 
jurisdiction’s statute of limitations unless there is evidence that a plaintiff 
chose to sue in Delaware in order to take advantage of Delaware’s longer 
statute of limitations.62 However, this purposivist construction of a statute 
may not be relevant where the parties have used a forum selection clause 
because, presumably, it is not possible to forum shop by selecting a 
contractually mandated forum. The plaintiff is simply not seeking a 
litigation advantage by suing in Delaware where a contract mandates that 
he sue in Delaware. The plaintiff has no choice. To the extent that a court 
uses a purposivist construction of the borrowing statute, another 
jurisdiction’s statute of limitations will not be imported and the Delaware 
“contractarian” rule will apply.63  
However, it appears that the majority rule in Delaware is to apply 
the borrowing statute according to its plain meaning without examining 
the purposes behind the statute.64 If courts use this literal construction, then 
the Delaware borrowing statute could very well “borrow” another state’s 
shorter statute of limitation.  
Thus, it remains theoretically possible for parties to sue in 
Delaware court, but have the dispute “arise” in another state which 
statutorily limits the parties’ ability to contractually shorten the statute of 
                                                   
61 Here, “purposivist” is intended to mean that a court will look to the legislature’s purpose 
(to discourage forum shopping) and conclude that where a contract specifically requires parties to 
litigate in a given forum, a plaintiff is not engaging in manipulative behavior by seeking a forum with 
favorable law because, at the time of filing a lawsuit, the plaintiff has no choice of forum. He will be 
bound to sue in the forum mandated by the agreement.  
62 See Bear Stearns Mortg. 2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *23 
(Ch. Jan. 12, 2015) (“[T]he borrowing statute only applies when a party seeks to take advantage of a 
longer Delaware statute of limitations to bring a claim that would be time-barred under the law of the 
jurisdiction governing the claim.”); cf. Lambda Optical Sols., LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc., 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107495, at *15–*16 (D. Del. Aug. 6, 2015) (applying Delaware law) (“[T]he 
Delaware borrowing statute’s terms should apply in all circumstances unless there is clear evidence 
that applying the statute would reward a party who intentionally engaged in forum shopping by filing 
suit in Delaware”). Ultimately, these cases are focused on a judicial construction of the statute’s 
purpose (to prevent forum shopping). This concern should not be raised by a forum selection clause, 
so the statute should be applied according to its plain meaning.  
63 See, e.g., Bear Stearns Mortg., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *23. As the Bear Stearns case 
insinuates, the purposivist rule may be an example of bad facts making bad law. Id. The purposivist 
reading originated in Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co. where a plaintiff 
brought suit in Delaware to preclude the defendant’s expected counterclaim which would not have 
been barred in Saudi Arabia where the claim arose. 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005). Thus, the plaintiff sought 
a form where its claims could be pursued while simultaneously using the shorter statute of limitations 
in Delaware as a shield against the defendant’s large counterclaims. Id. In this case, the literal meaning 
of the borrowing statute would require the application of the shorter Delaware statute of limitations 
which would bar the plaintiff’s claims. The case is a rare example of a plaintiff who was seeking the 
shorter statute of limitations. 
64 Lambda Optical, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107495, at *15–*16. 
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limitations (such as South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, and Missouri).65 In 
such a case, a Delaware court might also “borrow” or adopt that other 
state’s limitation on the parties’ ability to contractually shorten the 
limitations period notwithstanding Delaware’s normally permissive 
statute of limitations.66 In that event Delaware would be, in a sense, 
adopting the other jurisdiction’s statute for purposes of the dispute at 
issue.67 This point will become important later in the note when discussing 
whether the borrowing statute would mandate a temporary enactment of 
another jurisdiction’s controlling statute as an “accoutrement.” This topic 
will be discussed along with the importance of repealing—or modifying—
borrowing statutes.68 
C. Contractually “Specifying” the Limitations Period  
Another potential area for confusion arises because, while some 
jurisdictions require “clear and explicit” language to shorten the statute of 
limitations, Delaware does not require any specific language other than 
simply providing that reps and warranties will “terminate” after a specified 
period.69 However, in some “clear statement” jurisdictions, in order to 
shorten the statute of limitations, one must both (i) provide a clear 
statement that the reps and warranties will only “survive” up to a specific 
date, and (ii) provide that any action, lawsuit, or demand must be filed 
                                                   
65 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 (2012); ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (2017); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.03 
(2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 431030 (2015); Coquette Originals, Inc. v. Canadian Gulf Line of Florida., 
Inc., 240 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that “contractual provisions shortening 
statutory limitation periods are against public policy and void”).  
66 Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 384 P.3D 221, 226 (Ut. 2016) (“[W]hen a court relies 
on [a forum jurisdiction’s] borrowing statute, it does not merely apply a statute of limitations from 
another jurisdiction, but borrows or adopts that statute, making that statute [a statute of the forum 
jurisdiction] for purposes of a particular dispute.”).  
67 See id.  
68 See infra section III.B.1 (discussing the importance of repealing borrowing statutes). 
69 See GRT, Inc., v. Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., 2011 WL 2682898, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 
11, 2011) (treating the “survival” period as equivalent to a “contractarian” statute of limitations stating 
“there is no special rule requiring that in order to contractually shorten the statute of limitations, parties 
must utilize ‘clear and explicit’ language”); Sterling Network Exchange, LLC v. Digital Phoenix Van 
Buren, LLC., 2008 WL 2582920 (Del. Super. Mar. 28, 2008) (holding that language limiting the 
survival of representations and warranties to six months after closing created a contractual statute of 
limitations period of six months); ENI Holdings v. KBR Grp. Holdings, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 288, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2013) (holding that a survival clause limited actions to the survival period only, 
even though it did not specify that the remedies (indemnification rights), in addition to representations, 
would expire on the termination date); cf. Western Filter Corp v. Argan, Inc., 540 F.3d 947, 953 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (providing that, in order to shorten the statute of limitations by statute, the parties must use 
“clear and explicit” language which will be “strictly construed” against the party seeking to invoke the 
provision and holding that a limitation on “survival” was only relevant for when breach on reps and 
warranties may occur, but not when an action must be filed); Hurlbut v. Christiano, 63 A.D.2d 1116, 
1117–18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (refusing to “infer” that the statute of limitations had been shortened 
from a survival clause that limited the survival of contractual representations and warranties); Arcade 
Co. LTD. v. Arcade, LLC, 105 F. App’x 808, 810 (6th Cir 2004) (concluding that a “survival clause 
such as the one at issuer here, which contains no express reference to ‘actions,’ ‘demands,’ or even to 
the breach of the contract, does not clearly manifest an intent to establish a contractual imitations 
period”).  
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before a specific period.70 In other words, the contract must both state that 
the survival period is X years, and that after X years, no party can sue.  
Clear statement jurisdictions will distinguish between (i) the 
period within which a breach must be discovered and, (ii) a clause that 
explicitly cuts off a right to sue for the underlying representation.71 These 
jurisdictions impose this type of clear statement rule pursuant to the public 
policy of not favoring contract clauses that “limit the right to sue to a 
period shorter than that granted by statute.”72 Delaware, to the contrary, 
will construe a limitation on an indemnification right as a contractual 
statute of limitations.  
For example, Delaware courts have held that the following 
language unambiguously shortened the applicable statute of limitations: 
“the representations and warranties of the Seller . . . shall survive until the 
second anniversary of the closing date.”73 Contrast this language with 
jurisdictions that require “clear statements” to shorten a limitations period. 
Consider California and Idaho: courts in both of these jurisdictions have 
                                                   
70 I include this language as a bit of a drafting guide for practitioners. See, e.g., Giant Eagle, 
Inc. v. Excentus Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196191, at *33–*34 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2014) (noting 
that “a number of courts have split on this issue” and holding that a survival clause stating “all 
representations, warranties, covenants, and obligations of the parties shall survive the closing for a 
period of 18 months thereafter” did not shorten the statute of limitation to 18 months because it did 
not “contain words like ‘action,’ ‘lawsuit,’ or ‘demand’” or otherwise “referenc[e] potential claims or 
lawsuits”).  
71 See, e.g., Inhalation Plastics, Inc., v. Medex Cardio-Pulmonary, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34943, at *70 (S.D. Ohio Mar 13, 2013) (stating “representations and warranties . . . shall 
survive until one (1) year after the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations”). Id. The court 
held that this language “[was] a limitations period, but it is a limitation on the survival of 
indemnification obligations, not on [the plaintiff-purchaser’s] ability to sue [the seller] for breach of 
the [agreement.]” Id. (applying Ohio procedural law).  
72 Western Filter Corp., 540 F.3d 947 (applying California law and refusing to cut off a 
plaintiff’s right to sue at one year where an agreement specified representations “shall survive the 
closing for a period of one year”); see also Town of Crossville Hous. Auth. v. Murphy, 465 S.W.3d 
574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing the two types of jurisdictions and deciding, without adopting a 
position, that a clause stating “[t]he representations, warranties, and indemnification and obligations 
set forth in this agreement shall survive the execution of this Agreement for a period of (3) three years 
from the date hereof” unambiguously shortened the statute of limitations because the agreement also 
provided that notice of any purported claim would preserve the right to file a claim).  
73 See Aircraft Serv. Int’l, Inc., v. TBI Overseas Holdings, 2014 WL 4101660, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014). Note also that if the agreement does not specify a survival period, the default 
is that pre-closing representations do not survive closing. See Bear Stearns Mortg., 2006-SL1 v. EMC 
Mortg., LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 (Ch. Jan. 12, 2015) (“Absent contract language providing 
to the contrary, pre-closing representations about the acquired property interest become ineffective 
post-closing under the same rational that causes representations about real property to merge with a 
warranty deed.”). However, this default rule, that if the agreement is silent as to survival the 
representations and warranties do not survive closing, is also poorly understood by practitioners. See, 
e.g., Gregory Fine & Jessica Mendoza,  
Survival of Reps and Warranties: Avoiding Unpleasant Surprises for Buyers, MINTZ LEV
IN (May 16, 2014), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2014/Advisories/3992-0514-NATCORP-
MA/index.html (stating that, “[i]f a purchase agreement is silent as to survival, reps and warranties 
survive until the applicable jurisdiction’s statute of limitations for claims for breach of contract 
lapses.”). 
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held that agreements stating that representations “shall survive . . . for a 
period of one year” do not cut off the time within which a party could file 
suit.74 Instead, that language only “specif[ies] when a breach of the 
representations and warranties may occur.”75 
D. The Start of the Limitations Period  
Generally speaking, reps and warranties in a purchase agreement 
are either true or false when they are made, and the plaintiff can commence 
legal action immediately. Thus, claims by a plaintiff seeking 
indemnification for a breached representation accrue at closing, and the 
statute of limitations begins running at that same date whether or not the 
purchaser had actual knowledge of the breach.76  
Note that accrual is another area where clarity is important. Courts 
usually hold that claims for indemnification based on breached reps and 
warranties accrue at closing.77 However, closing-accrual may not occur for 
a stand-alone indemnification right that is specifically related to other 
kinds of claims (i.e., indemnification rights not tied to reps and 
warranties).78 In other words, the agreement could grant the buyer a stand-
alone right to be indemnified for any future environmental costs associated 
with the intentional bad-acts of the seller. Presumably, this type of claim 
would accrue when the cost was incurred and not at closing because it is a 
more traditional indemnification right.79 This type of right, in effect, would 
                                                   
74 Western Filter Corp., 540 F.3d 947; Pinnacle Great Plans Operating Co. v. Wynn 
Dewsnup Revocable Trust, 996 F. Supp. 2d. 1026, 1036 (D. Idaho 2014).  
75 Id. (citing Western Filter, 540 F.3d at 954). Note that both of these cases appear to 
fundamentally misunderstand when a rep or warranty in a purchase agreement is breached (i.e., at 
closing). Id. 
76 See Certainteed Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 217032 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005); GRT, 
Inc., v. Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., 2011 WL 2682898, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2011) (“The 
[contractual limitations period] typically begins to run when the contract is breached, whether or not 
the plaintiff was aware of such breach. Because representations and warranties about facts pre-
existing, or contemporaneous with, a contract’s closing are to be true and accurate when made, a 
breach occurs on the date of the contract’s closing and hence the cause of action accrues on that date.”). 
New York has a similar rule. See ResCap Liquidating Trust Mortg. Purchase Litig. v. HSBC Mortg. 
Corp., 524 B.R. 563, 591 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that the accrual date for the breach of 
representations and warranties is at closing and that a plaintiff cannot plead around this rule by arguing 
that the defendant separately breached the agreement by failing to remedy any alleged breaches 
“[Defendant]’s alleged failure to comply with its cure or repurchase obligations does not give rise to 
a separate breach of contract at the time of refusal because New York law does not recognize pre-suit 
remedial provisions as constituting separate promises which can serve as the basis for independent 
causes of action”). Note that the tolling period may start at different times depending on whether the 
“Claim relates to a present or a prospective warranty, a representation, a covenant, or a third-party 
claim.” See DiVincenzo, supra note 8, at 36.  
77 See infra note 79.  
78 See infra note 79. 
79 See Certainteed Corp., 2005 WL 217032 (explaining the difference between common 
law indemnification and indemnification for breaches of representations and warranties); Robert B. 
Little & Chris Babcock, M&A Report – When the Contractual Rubber Meets the Statutory Road: 
Drafting Contractual Survival Provisions in Light of State Law Statutes of Limitations, GIBSON DUNN 
(March 20, 2014) https://www.gibsondunn. 
com/ma-report-when-the-contractual-rubber-meets-the-statutory-road-drafting-
contractual-survival-provisions-in-light-of-state-law-statutes-of-limitations/ (explaining how to draft 
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make the seller an insurer for the purchaser in a way that was unrelated to 
any reps or warranties. 
E. Requiring Notice of a Suspected Breach of Reps and Warranties  
Normally, as discussed, a plaintiff must actually file suit to satisfy 
the statute of limitations. There is one notable exception to this rule. The 
parties can use a notice provision to require the buyer to notify the seller 
in the event that one of the reps and warranties turns out to be defective. 
This notice can “toll” the statute of limitations.80 In other words, if the 
agreement is properly written, a buyer need not actually file a lawsuit 
within the survival period in order to satisfy the statute of limitations. 
Instead, he might simply give proper contractual notice to the seller of a 
suspected defect which will give more time to resolve the issue while still 
preserving the buyer’s ultimate recourse of filing suit.81 A key issue in 
these cases becomes (i)what is the trigger for the toll and (ii)what is the 
duration of the toll? Contracts should carefully define both.82 
For example, in Friedman Fleisher & Lowe v. AccentCare, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held that a buyer’s suit was foreclosed when 
a buyer filed suit after of the survival period because—even though the 
buyer gave notice of his claim to the seller before the survival period had 
run—the agreement did not explicitly provide that such notice would 
extend the survival period.83 In short, the court adopted a rule that unless 
a notice provision explicitly extends the time period for filing a suit, the 
survival period is not extended by notice.84 The notice provision is reduced 
to a courtesy that the buyer must give to the seller before filing suit which 
has no impact on the underlying survival period. The notice is merely a 
                                                   
a contract such that the statute of limitations does not prevent an extension of the buyer’s ability to file 
suit).  
80 See Aircraft Service International v. TBI Overseas Holdings, 2014 WL 4101660, at *4 
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014) (involving language “[i]n addition, if written notice of a violation or 
breach of any specified representation [or] warranty . . . is given to the party charged with such 
violation or breach during the [survival period], such representation [or] warranty . . . shall continue 
to survive until such matter has been resolved by settlement, litigation (including all appeals related 
thereto) or otherwise.”).  
81 Note that the language of the agreement is key. If the exact requirements of the notice 
provision are not followed, then the default rule, that the buyer must actually file suit within the 
limitations period, will be in effect. See HBMA Holdings v. LSF9 Stardust Holdings, 2017 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 841, at *14 (Ch. Dec. 8, 2017) (holding that, because a plaintiff’s contractual notice did not 
specifically reference an indemnification section of the agreement, it was not proper notice pursuant 
to the contract language which required a notice that specifically referenced the indemnification 
section); Friedman Fleischer & Lowe, LLC v. AccentCare, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 218 at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 29, 2016) (explaining the default rule: “[w]hen parties have shortened the statute of 
limitations by providing that representations and warranties survive through a specified date, the party 
claiming breach must file suit within the specified time period. Providing notice within the specified 
time period is not enough.”).  
82 See Aircraft Service International, 2014 WL 4101660, at *4 (remanding case for more 
factual findings on these issues).  
83 Friedman Fleisher & Lowe, LLC, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 218 at *7.  
84 Id. 
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procedural condition precedent to filing suit. Therefore, agreements 
should be clear about whether the notice is simply a procedural condition 
precedent to filing suit or both a condition precedent and a mechanism to 
toll the contractual indemnity period (within which suit must be filed).85 
F. Choice of Law Provisions  
Traditionally, the Erie doctrine86 would require the application of 
a forum’s statute of limitations. However, some jurisdictions—excluding 
Delaware—have held that a choice of law provision (e.g., “this agreement 
should be governed by California law”) requires the application of 
California’s statute of limitations instead of the forum’s statute of 
limitations.87 This alternative view adheres to the idea that statutes of 
limitation are substantive—at least in the face of a contractual choice of 
law provision in the M&A context. This is a shift from the traditional rule 
that statutes of limitation are procedural and should be supplied by the 
forum.  
Alternatively, as a third option, if a forum selection clause singles 
out a specific state’s statute of limitations to govern the agreement (e.g., 
“Delaware law, including its statute of limitation, shall govern this 
agreement”), it is likely that Delaware courts, with their tendency to honor 
bargained-for agreements, would give effect to that bargain.88 Some 
jurisdictions have adopted this position and allow parties to specifically 
                                                   
85 If the agreement is unclear, the parties run the risk that a court may hold that the survival 
period remains the (contractual) statute of limitations period before which a suit must be filed and that 
the notice provision does not extend the time within which a suit may be filed. See, e.g., ENI Holdings 
v. KBR Grp. Holdings, 2013 WL 6186326 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2013).  
86 References to the Erie doctrine refer to Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), wherein 
the Supreme Court held that “[t]here is no federal general common law” and, in so holding, began a 
long line of cases that distinguished between substantive and procedural questions of law.  
87 Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int’l., Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 
1542 (1995). Explaining California’s position, the court wrote, “[w]e therefore decline plaintiffs' 
invitation to read the choice-of-law provision as if it incorporated only the substantive law of 
Delaware, i.e., excluded Delaware procedural law. Although statutes of limitations may be viewed as 
procedural rather than substantive in some contexts, the choice-of-law clause in this case does not 
make a distinction along those lines. It simply incorporates the ‘laws’ of Delaware without using any 
adjectives or other qualifiers.” Id. Interestingly, while Florida is among the states that statutorily 
prohibit parties from contractually shortening statutes of limitations, its courts appear to treat the 
statute of limitations as a substantive issue and not a procedural issue. See Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs 
of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a choice of law provision in a contract 
that selected Michigan law to govern the agreement would allow parties to shorten the statute of 
limitations notwithstanding Florida’s statutory prohibition—the case did not discuss the issue that 
statutes of limitation are normally procedural).  
88 Delaware statutorily allows parties to select law in a choice of law provision, but it is not 
clear that such a provision would override the traditional substantive / procedural distinction. See Del. 
Code. Ann. tit 6, § 2708 (West 1993) (“The parties to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, 
contingent or otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement or other undertaking shall 
be governed by or construed under the laws of this State, without regard to principles of conflict of 
laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole or in part, any or all of their rights, remedies, 
liabilities, powers and duties if the parties.”). Note that, as a general principal, Delaware courts attempt 
to honor parties bargained-for allocation of risk. See generally EMSI Acquisition, Inc. v. Contrarian 
Funds, LLC, 2017 WL 1732369 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2017) (“[Buyer] cannot reach the [sellers] on an 
indemnification claim beyond the bargained-for limits.”).  
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select a forum’s statute of limitation if they do so explicitly.89 Note 
however that in these “specific selection” states, courts refuse to abandon 
the traditional rule that statutes of limitation are procedural and governed 
by the law of the forum absent explicit language in the agreement.90 
G. Lengthening of the Statute of Limitations 
Delaware’s statute of limitations prohibits parties from 
contractually lengthening the statute of limitations past twenty years.91 
This prohibition is based off of evidentiary policy decisions to “preven[t] 
allegedly-breaching parties from being unfairly made to address stale 
claims for which proof becomes progressively less trustworthy over 
time.”92 Thus, while Delaware is willing to adopt a contractarian stance 
towards shortening the statute of limitations, it is unwilling to afford 
parties similar latitude to lengthen the period—at least beyond twenty 
years.  
Other jurisdictions have similar policy positions to the effect that 
contracts which lengthen the applicable statute of limitations are void as 
against public policy.93 However, as noted previously, it may be possible 
for the seller to grant the purchaser an independent indemnification right 
that is unrelated to any representation or warranty—such that the claim did 
not accrue until the buyer made a demand on the seller.94 This would, in 
effect, make the seller an insurer for the purchaser.95  
                                                   
89 See Western Video Collectors, L.P. v. Mercantile Bank of Kansas, 23 Kan. App. 2d 705, 
706 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“[U]nless the parties expressly agree to apply the statute of limitations of 
another state, general choice of law provisions in contracts incorporate only substantive law and do 
not displace the procedural law of the forum state.”); Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Barclays Bank 
PLC, 156 A.D.3d 401, 403 (2017) (“As to the New York choice of law clauses of the relevant 
agreements, because these provisions do not expressly incorporate the New York statute of limitations, 
they cannot be read to encompass that limitation period.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
90 Id.  
91 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10 § 8106(c) (West 2014) (“[A]n action based on a written contract, 
agreement or undertaking involving at least $100,000 may be brought within a period specified in such 
written contract, agreement or undertaking provided it is brought prior to the expiration of 20 years 
from the accruing of the cause of such action).  
92 ENI Holdings v. KBR Grp. Holdings, 2013 WL 6186326 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2013). 
93 See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Flagstar Capital Mkts. Corp., 143 A.D.3d 15, 16, 
(App. Div. 2016) (holding that, under New York law, a contract which stated that a right to 
indemnification for breached representations and warranties related to loans would “accrue . . . upon 
discovery” was void against public policy because it had the effect of extending the statute of 
limitations period). New York law will not allow a plaintiff to plead around this rule by arguing that 
the defendant committed a separate breach by failing to perform under the indemnification right. Id.  
94 See Little & Babcock, supra note 79. 
95 Also, some states allow for a longer limitation period for contracts that are signed “under 
seal” which could also be a good option for parties that want to keep the seller on the hook for a longer 
period of time. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-33 (setting a ten-year statute of limitations for contracts 
signed under seal).  
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H. Summary of Current Law  
In summary, there are jurisdictional differences when it comes to 
whether statutes of limitation are substantive or procedural,96 what levels 
of specificity are required to contractually set the limitations period,97 and 
whether states permit any contractual modification of the statute of 
limitations.98 While current law creates a bit of a maze for parties to get 
what they bargained for, there are ways to simplify this area of law.  
 
 III. SOLUTION 
 
 In determining how a court will enforce a survival clause, there 
are three main variables: (1) the forum selection clause, (2) the choice of 
law provision, and (3) the way that the contract words its indemnification 
and survival clauses.  
First, the forum selection clause will, at least under the traditional 
rule, determine the procedural law that governs the agreement.99 Second, 
the choice of law provision will select the substantive law to govern the 
agreement, and third, the contract itself is an important source of law. This 
note assumes that the “correct” legal outcome is for courts to require a 
plaintiff to bring suit within the survival period.  
The main threats to the “correct” outcomes are, as previously 
mentioned, that (i) a forum state will use its borrowing statute to “borrow” 
another state’s statute of limitation which could include a controlling 
statute, and (ii) that a forum with a controlling statute will disregard a 
choice of law provision in a contract and substitute its own procedural law. 
Either of these two outcomes could throw off the parties bargained-for risk 
allocation.  
A. Contractual Solutions  
There are two main strategies that parties can adopt to reduce the 
aforementioned risks: (i) carefully worded choice of law provisions and 
(ii) liability limitations clauses. First, in jurisdictions that prohibit 
contractual shortening of the applicable statute of limitations, the parties 
                                                   
96 Compare Bear Stearns Mortg, 2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, 
at *38 (Ch. Jan. 12, 2015) (following established Delaware precedent that statutes of limitation are 
procedural and governed by the law of the forum) with Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. 
Med. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1540–43 (1995) (holding that, at least where there is a 
contractual choice of law provision, statutes of limitation are substantive).  
97 Compare Western Filter v. Argan, Inc., 540 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
parties must use “clear and explicit” language to shorten a statute of limitation) with GRT, Inc. v. 
Marathon GTF Tech. Ltd., 2011 WL 2682898 *11 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2011) (rejecting a rule that parties 
must explicitly prohibit the filing of a lawsuit after a specific period and holding that stating a claim 
would survive for a specific period is enough). 
98 Compare Del. Code Ann tit. 10 § 8106(c) (West 2014) (allowing parties to contractually 
set a limitations period as long as the contract involves at least $100,000) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
2-140 (2012); ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 431030 
(2015) (prohibiting contractual shortening).  
99 See supra note 88.  
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may be able to contract around the default rule that statutes of limitation 
are procedural (i.e., supplied by the law of the forum) by emphasizing the 
centrality and substantive nature of the survival period. This approach was 
explained in Section II.F which details how some agreements may be able 
to turn procedural rules into substantive rules by emphasizing their 
centrality to agreements.100  
In other words, the parties may be able to specify that the duration 
of the indemnification right is substantive for the purposes of their 
agreement. Whether the parties are able to achieve this procedural–
substantive shift will turn on the forum’s law on the conflict of laws.101 
While a complete fifty-state survey is beyond the purview of this note, a 
strong case can be made that—at least for shortening the statute of 
limitations—parties should be able to contract around the traditional rule 
that statutes of limitation are procedural.102 
The traditional distinction between substantive and procedural 
rights is that a statute of limitation “does not wipe out the substantive right; 
it merely suspends the remedy.”103 In other words, while a party may have 
a substantive right to indemnification under an agreement, the courts of 
the forum jurisdiction will not provide a remedy for the breach of that right 
after a specific time period. 
Contrarily, in an agreement that creates a right to indemnification, 
but only for a limited time period, it is most precise to say that the contract 
granted a substantive right with a temporal component.104 A buyer should 
not be able to legally vindicate a substantive right that the seller did not 
give. As has been shown in this note, the survival period is one of the most 
negotiated terms in an M&A agreement.105 A right to indemnification for 
defective reps and warranties that lasts six months could be worth millions 
less than a similar right that lasts five years.106 Thus, while the traditional 
                                                   
100 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 2708 (West 1993) (“The parties to any contract, agreement 
or other undertaking, contingent or otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement or 
other undertaking shall be governed by or construed under the laws of this State, without regard to 
principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole or in part, any or all 
of their rights, remedies, liabilities, powers and duties of the parties . . .”). 
101 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.  
102 Note that California has already taken this stance. See Hambrecht v. Am. Med. Int’l, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (Ct. App. 1995). As an aside, however, it may be hard to predict how such language 
in an agreement would interact with borrowing statutes. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 (2012); 
ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §95.03 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 431030 (2015). 
103 Tanges v. Heidelberg North Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250, 253 (N.Y. 1999).  
104 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between a traditional 
right to indemnification and a M&A indemnification for reps and warranties).  
105 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (showing that almost all M&A 
agreements specifically list the survival period).  
106 See generally Hamed Meshki & Brandon Vongsawad, Why you need M&A Reps and 
Warranties Insurance, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.kirkland.com/ 
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rule is that statutes of limitation pertain to the availability of a remedy, a 
limited survival period is—by its nature—substantive in the minds of the 
parties.  
Further, courts sometimes refer to the statute of limitation as 
expressing the legislature’s policy judgment regarding the use of judicial 
resources and the litigation of stale claims for which evidence is scant.107 
This rationale is inapplicable to a contractual shortening of the limitations 
period between sophisticated parties who specifically addressed the issue, 
and should in fact help to preserve judicial resources.  
Other courts, as exhibited in the Dewsnup case, rely on an 
amorphous “fundamental policy [of] requiring strict adherence to . . . 
statutory limitations period[s].”108 It is unclear what the motivating 
principle behind this fundamental policy is. If legislatures are concerned 
about asymmetric bargaining power and draconian limitations periods, 
then they could follow the Delaware legislature which only grants 
flexibility to parties negotiating contracts valued at over $100,000.  
The most important point to remember is that to the extent that 
“substantive” rights turn on the intent of the contracting parties, if courts 
were to substitute a different limitation period than the survival period in 
the contract, they would be giving a substantive right to the buyer that the 
seller did not grant. Under every meaning of the word, the length of the 
survival period is substantive to an M&A agreement. This would be even 
more true where the contract explicitly mentioned the statute of limitations 
in its choice of law provision because it shows that the parties’ intention 
was for courts to respect their bargained-for limitation. Thus, courts should 
adopt a rule—as California has—that an “agreement’s unqualified 
reference to the ‘laws’ of [a state in the choice of law provision] referred 
to all of that jurisdiction’s statutory laws, including its statutes of 
limitation.”109 This will, in turn, allow parties to select a forum with a 
“contractarian” statute of limitation.  
However, this is only a partial solution, because there is still a risk 
that a “contractarian” state will also have a borrowing statute.110 For 
example, even if the parties select Delaware law, Delaware law might 
borrow from a state where the contract arose which could include a 
                                                   
siteFiles/Publications/Law360%20(M&A%20Insurance_%20Meshki,%20Vongsawad%2
0byline)%20July%202013.pdf (discussing the costs of insurance for reps & warranties and how they 
vary based on time periods).  
107 GRT, Inc. v. Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., 2011 WL 2682898, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jul. 11, 
2011) (quoting CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 83.8, at 289–90 (1993) (“Because the purpose of a statute 
of limitations is ‘to prevent the bringing and enforcement of stale claims . . .,’ courts do not enforce 
parties' agreements to lengthen the limitations period.”). 
108 See Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Wynn Dewsnup Revocable Trust, 996 
F.Supp.2d 1026, 1034 (D. Idaho 2014).  
109 See Hughes Elecs. Corp. v. Citibank Delaware, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 250 (Ct. App. 
2004).  
110 Delaware is such a state. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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controlling statute.111 Thus, at least when parties’ agreements arise in a 
jurisdiction with a controlling statute, the parties may be limited in their 
ability to contract around that limitation.112 
For parties in these situations, they might consider a liability 
limitation provision. Such a provision would state that: “for lawsuits filed 
after [eighteen months] from the closing date, the buyer’s sole remedy for 
breaches of the seller’s representations and warranties shall be a suit for 
indemnification, and damages for such a breach shall be capped at [a very 
low number].” This would not prevent the parties from filing suit, but it 
would achieve the goal of shifting risk to the buyer after some time 
period.113 
B. Legislative Solutions 
While Delaware has taken significant steps to increase the 
freedom of contract regarding limitations periods, Delaware and other 
states should take additional steps to statutorily enable contracts with a 
value of over $100,000 to contractually specify how they want their 
agreement to behave in court.114 Specifically, States should both (i) amend 
                                                   
111 To explain this scenario, imagine that two South Carolina entities are in a South Carolina 
court litigating a contract with a choice of law provision that selects Delaware law. Imagine also that 
the seller is able to persuade the South Carolina state court to treat the choice of law provision as also 
selecting the Delaware statute of limitations. This would seem to solve the problem and put the 
agreement under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8106 (allowing the parties to set any limitation period less 
than 20 years for contracts worth more than $100,000 and avoiding South Carolina’s prohibition on 
shortening from section 15-3-140 of the South Carolina Code Annotated). However, Delaware also 
has its borrowing statute under section 8121 of the Delaware Code Annotated (requiring courts to 
apply the shorter of the Delaware statute of limitations or the statute of limitation from the jurisdiction 
where the claim arose). Thus, similarly to the court in Hughes Elecs. Corp., the South Carolina court 
could take the choice of law provision to include both the statute of limitation and the borrowing statue 
which would put the parties right back under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 which prohibits shortening. 
See Hughes Elecs. Corp., 15 Cal Rptr. 3d 244. Note that it is unsettled whether the Delaware borrowing 
statute would also borrow another state’s prohibition on shortening. This is discussed in more detail 
later in this note.  
112 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975). The Alabama borrowing statute, unlike the 
Delaware statute, does not require applying the shorter statute of limitations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 
§ 8121 (1947). Rather, the Alabama borrowing statute requires that a court apply the statute of 
limitations “in the same manner it would have been in the state or country where the act was done or 
the contract was made.” ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975). States with borrowing statutes like Alabama are 
much more likely to borrow a statutory prohibition on shortening.  
113 While the enforceability of such a liquidated damages clause is beyond the purview of 
this note, a brief review of Delaware case law indicates that such a limitation would be enforceable. 
See eCommerce Indus., Inc. v. MWA Intelligence, Inc., 2013 WL 5621678, at *45 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 
2013) (“Under Delaware law, limitation on liability clauses that preclude various types of damages, 
such as consequential damages, are typically enforceable . . . freedom of contract would suggest that 
parties to a contract should be entitled to draft agreements so as to avoid certain of the duties and 
liabilities that are normally part of a contractual relationship.”); Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W 
Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d. 1032, 1064 (Del. Ch. 2006) (upholding a limitation of liability for an 
indemnification right unless the seller intentionally misrepresented facts). 
114 The Delaware legislature could take a strong leadership role for other state legislatures, 
and it has a strong tradition of promoting the freedom of contract. In the amendments to the Statute of 
Limitations in § 8106, the House Judiciary Committee commented that it was attempting to “help 
make business law in Delaware more palatable” by allowing parties to specify a limitation period 
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their borrowing statutes to specify that nothing should limit parties ability 
to provide a limitations period that is less than 20 years, and (ii) amend 
their choice of law statutes, similar to Delaware Code Section 2708, to 
specifically allow parties to a contract involving more than $100,000 to 
agree that their undertaking shall be governed under the laws of their state, 
including their statute of limitation.115 Both of these changes, taken 
together, would increase parties’ ability to select “contractarian” law and 
reduce the risk that another state’s prohibition on contractual shortening 
would constrain the freedom of contract.  
1. Borrowing Statutes and Accoutrements 
The first group of amendments to borrowing statutes, such as 
Delaware Code Section 8121, would eliminate the threat that the forum 
state would “borrow” another state’s prohibition on contractual shortening 
or lengthening where a dispute arose in another jurisdiction.116 Current law 
is unclear as to whether a Delaware court would borrow another state’s 
statutory prohibition on contractual shortening or lengthening as an 
“accoutrement” to the statute of limitations.117 A federal district court, 
applying Delaware law from the Delaware supreme court, wrote that 
section 8121 required a Delaware court to apply “another jurisdiction’s 
statute of limitations . . . with all its accoutrements[;] includ[ing] . . . rules 
governing time when causes of action accrue.”118 Thus, it is unclear 
whether a defendant-seller who had selected Delaware law to govern her 
agreement, and who was in court in Delaware, would be able to win on a 
statute of limitations defense if the dispute underlying her lawsuit had 
arisen in South Carolina.119 This is true even though she signed an 
agreement that would otherwise have limited a buyer-plaintiff’s right to 
sue for indemnification.120  
For example, the logic of the Delaware statute for contractual 
shortening, under its plain meaning, would be as follows: If the agreement 
limited the buyer’s right to sue to one year after closing, and arose in South 
                                                   
longer than the standard period without signing a contract under seal. See Del. H.B. 363, 147th Gen. 
Assemb. § 1 (2014).  
115 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2780 (2012). 
116 Delaware Code Section 8121 reads: “Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, 
an action cannot be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after the expiration 
of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of this State, or the time limited by the law of the 
state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action.” 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (2012). 
117 Id. 
118 See Plumb v. Cottle, 492 F.Supp. 1330, 1336 (1980) (citing Frombach v. Gilbert Assoc., 
236 A.2d 363 (Del. 1967)).  
119 Id. 
120 The problem is that it is unclear whether the South Carolina limitation on contractual 
shortening would be considered an “accoutrement” of the statute of limitations. See S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-3-140 (2012) (“No . . . agreement in any contract of whatsoever nature, verbal or written, whereby 
it is agreed that either party shall be barred from bringing suit upon any cause of action arising out of 
the contract if not brought within a period less than the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, 
for similar causes of action, shall bar such action, but the action may be brought notwithstanding such 
clause”).  
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Carolina, then the court would apply the “shorter” of “the time limited by 
the law of [South Carolina]” or the time limited by Delaware Law.121 This 
would mean comparing the shorter contractual limitations period and the 
longer, three-year period of limitations under South Carolina law.122 Thus, 
under its plain meaning, the borrowing statute would select the contractual 
limitations period instead of the statutory period in South Carolina.123  
However, cases that speak of the Delaware borrowing statute as 
borrowing “accoutrements” could create uncertainty in this area.124 A 
plaintiff could argue that the Delaware court should adopt another state’s 
policy determination on limiting limitations periods as a procedural 
“accoutrement” to the limitations period.125  
Additionally, other states with borrowing statutes have rules that 
borrow another statute of limitation. In other words, by the terms of the 
borrowing statute, courts should not only borrow the limitations period but 
also apply the limitations period as the other jurisdiction would.126 For 
example, Alabama’s borrowing statute applies the other jurisdiction’s 
statute of limitations “in the same manner it would have been in the state 
or country where the . . . contract [was] made.”127 This type of borrowing 
statute would be much more likely to “borrow” a controlling statute.128  
Alternatively, contractual lengthening of the limitations period is 
seriously jeopardized by the borrowing statute.129 When examining a 
survival period that lengthens the statute of limitations, a Delaware court 
would compare another jurisdiction’s statute of limitation with the twenty-
year contractual limitations period in Delaware.130 The borrowing statute 
instructs the court to apply the “shorter” of the two statutes.131 This 
comparison could cut off a buyer’s right to indemnification sooner than 
                                                   
121 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (2012). 
122 S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (2012) (setting a three-year limitation for contracts).  
123 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (2012). 
124 Frombach v. Gilbert Assoc., 236 A.2d 363, 366 (Del. 1967) (“[T]he borrowed 
limitations statute is accepted with all its accoutrements.”). 
125 Id. “Under Delaware borrowing statute, the borrowed limitations statute is accepted with 
all its accoutrements.” Id.  
126 See, e.g., id. 
127 ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975).  
128 See Frombach, 236 A.2d at 366. 
129 See Del. H.B. 363, 147th Gen. Assemb. § 1 (2014) (Bill 363 “gives clear statutory 
authorization to the parties’ freedom to contract beyond the three or four year statutory period without 
resorting to the use of a sealed instrument, as long as the contract involves at least $100,000 and is in 
writing.”).  
130 Note that, while a twenty-year survival period is long, fundamental representations are 
subject to longer survival periods with some even claiming to survive indefinitely. See Fortis Insight: 
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the parties bargained for if another jurisdiction’s statutory or common law 
prohibition on lengthening.132  
2. Controlling Statutes 
States should repeal controlling statutes, at least for contracts with 
a value of over $100,000 because the traditional rationale for strict 
enforcement of the statutes of limitation is inapplicable to survival periods 
in M&A transactions. Further, regarding contractual lengthening, as has 
been previously stated, statutes of limitation embody the legislature’s 
policy judgment that after a certain period of time, the courts should not 
hear stale claims because they both waste the judiciary’s resources and are 
particularly susceptible to falsification to the detriment of defendants.133  
First, regarding contractual lengthening, it is probably a good idea 
to prevent a buyer from suing a seller for a breached representation that is 
discovered two-hundred years post-closing. However, some states have 
relatively short statutes of limitation for claims based upon contract, but, 
with the addition of a simple “sealed” document, allow claims to be 
brought after a much longer period.134 It seems extremely formalistic to 
allow parties to bring a suit up to seventeen additional years later by simply 
calling a signature “sealed.”135 Further, it presents a rather easy-to-
circumvent attempt to conserve judicial recourses.136 Therefore, at least to 
the extent that a state is willing to allow suit based off of a “sealed” 
document, it seems even-handed to allow parties to a high-dollar-value 
transaction to contractually specify the limitations period (at least up to 
what they could have achieved under seal). 
Similarly, states with controlling statutes should feel no need to 
protect sophisticated parties who bargain for a shorter survival period (and 
who shift purchase prices in light of the bargain).137 This note is not 
dealing with a situation where the seller engages in either fraud or duress 
to extract a shorter limitations period, but with a situation where a seller 
agrees to accept a specific price and one of the reasons for such acceptance 
                                                   
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., supra note 93; See also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 522 U.S. 
130 (2008) (“Most statutes of limitations seek . . . to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed 
claims.”); DiVincenzo, supra note 8, at 30 (explaining that the Delaware statute of limitations is a 
statute of repose “intended to discourage stale disputes where the passage of time may have made 
determination of the facts more difficult”).  
134 A sealed document basically just requires a notary to witness the signing. See, e.g., S.C. 
CODE ANN. §15-3-530 (2012) (setting a three-year period for standard contracts); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§15-3-520 (2012) (allowing an “action upon a sealed instrument” to be brought up to twenty years 
after accrual).  
135 It is not difficult to “seal” a document. See Carolina Marine Handling, Inc. v. Lasch, 
609 S.E.2d 548, 551 (S.C. Ct. App 2005) (“If it appears from a non-sealed instrument that the parties 
intended for the contract to be sealed, it will be deemed sealed.”). 
136 Id. 
137 The Delaware courts have said it best: “parties who contract for an abbreviated 
limitations period must be held to their bargain.” ENI Holdings v. KBR Grp. Holdings, 2013 WL 
61836, at *15 (Del. Ch. 2013). Note also that Delaware was careful to limit the ability of a party to 
contractually shorten the limitations period to high-dollar-value transactions worth over $100,000. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8106 (2012).  
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has to do with her share of the risk.138 In the modern M&A context, broad 
provisions that prohibit parties from contractually limiting a buyer’s right 
to sue would only have the effect of giving such buyer a windfall.  
A good example of a statute that still prevents contractual 
shortening as a default rule, yet carves out an exception for contractual 
shortening in sophisticated business transactions originates in Texas:  
 
[A] person may not enter a[n] . . . agreement that purports 
to limit the time in which to bring suit on the . . . 
agreement to a period shorter than two years. A[n] . . . 
agreement that establishes a limitations period that is 
shorter than two years is void in this state. . . . This section 
does not apply to a[n] . . . agreement relating to the sale 
or purchase of a business entity if a party to the . . . 
agreement pays or receives or is obligated to pay or 
entitled to receive . . . value of not less than $500,000.139 
 
This language will cause an increased freedom of contract in the M&A 
context by allowing parties to use the survival period as a bargaining chip 
rather than being limited to the default state statute of limitations.  
In summary, states should follow Delaware’s lead and repeal 
controlling statutes, and go a step further to resolve any ambiguity about 
shortening or lengthening (for contracts above a specified dollar amount).  
C. Judicial/litigation Solutions under Current Law  
Notwithstanding all of the previous discussion in this note, it may 
be possible to help parties get what they bargain for even if legislatures 
fail to act. It may be possible to distinguish between the contractual right 
to indemnification and the common law right to sue for breached reps and 
warranties. To explain this point, consider the following hypothetical.  
Consider, again, the facts of Dewsnup: the case concerns a breach 
of a seller’s reps and warranties; a controlling state law statute 
procedurally governed the case; the defendant sought summary judgment 
based upon a contractual survival period that was shorter than the statute 
                                                   
138 Note that most American jurisdictions would have either “fraud” or “duress” exceptions 
for those situations and void or render a contract voidable. See, e.g., Cafer v. Ash, 2015 WL 4366541, 
at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (“American courts have traditionally taken the view that competent parties 
may make contracts on their own terms, provided such contracts are neither illegal nor contrary to 
public policy.”). Under Delaware law, courts have held that a defendant-seller cannot “knowingly . . . 
prevent [the buyer] from learning facts or otherwise [make] misrepresentations intended to ‘put the 
plaintiff off the trail of inquiry.’” Krahmer v. Christie’s Inc., 911 A.2d 399, 407 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
Silence by the defendant-seller will be insufficient, rather the defendant must employ some “actual 
artifice.” Id. 
139 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.070 (West 2017). 
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of limitations, but the statutory limitations period had not yet expired.140 
As this note has explained, the buyer may be able to argue that the 
contractual survival period is void based upon the controlling statute. 
However, the seller could make the argument explained below.  
The argument concerning contractual survival periods not 
violating controlling statutes is that the contractual right to indemnity is a 
distinct substantive right that is inextricably tied to duration. No specific 
case follows this line of argument, but courts have not explored the 
interaction between the statute of limitations and survival clauses in the 
first place, so creative argument exists in this area. 
To understand this argument, the first key point is that, by default 
rule, reps and warranties do not survive closing.141 Therefore, one would 
not naturally say that survival periods cut off the remedy for a substantive 
right upon expiration. Instead, survival periods actually create the buyer’s 
substantive right to rely upon the seller’s reps and warranties.142 Delaware 
law is clear that a party can disclaim all reps and warranties.143 Such a 
disclaimer (frequently called a “non-reliance provision”) effectively 
leaves the buyer without the substantive legal right to rely upon the 
veracity—or the mere existence of—the defendant seller’s statements 
about the company.144 If a seller can totally eliminate a buyer’s post-
closing right to sue for breached reps and warranties or even disclaim them 
altogether, she should be able to create a limited substantive right to rely 
upon her statements. The very nature of a procedural rule (such as a statute 
of limitation) is that it “does not wipe out [or create] the substantive right; 
it merely suspends the remedy.”145 It seems illogical to have a default rule 
that reps and warranties do not survive closing, but they must survive up 
to the statute of limitations if the default rule is not used. This all or nothing 
approach seems like a pointless abrogation of the freedom of contract.  
The substantive right to rely on a seller’s statements of fact was 
originally the creation of common law.146 The historical rule, caveat 
emptor, put all risks on the buyer.147 However, courts decided that a seller 
could not haphazardly offer affirmative statements about the subject of the 
contract without some expectation that the seller would rely on those 
statements.148 Presumably, this common law right was limited by a statute 
                                                   
140 Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Wynn Dewsnup Revocable Trust, 996 F. Supp. 
2d 1026, 1029, 1037 (D. Idaho 2014).  
141 See Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Trust 2006-SL1 v. EMC Mortg. LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 9, at *41 (Ch. Jan. 12, 2015).  
142 See generally RAA Mgmt., LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107, 117–19 
(Del. 2012) (upholding a non-reliance provision as not against public policy); see also supra note 65. 
143 RAA Mgmt., LLC, 45 A.3d at 116–17. 
144 See id. at 115–20. 
145 Tanges v. Heidelberg North Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250, 253 (N.Y. 1999). 
146 See, e.g., Wilmington & Augusta R.R. v. Ling, 18 S.C. 116, 119 (1882).  
147 Caveat Emptor, INVESTOPEDIA (2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
caveatemptor.asp#. 
148 Id.  
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of repose to prevent a buyer from sleeping on those rights.149 Note 
specifically that the statute of repose arose to cut off a substantive right 
that the parties did not explicitly create.150 Instead, the statute of repose 
was a judicial or legislative protection for sellers that was needed because 
courts created the open-ended common law right for a buyer to rely upon 
the seller’s representations.151 
Contracts evolved, and parties began explicitly listing their reps 
and warranties while disclaiming all others. Respect for the freedom of 
contract allowed buyers to contractually wave any such substantive right 
to reliance where it was clear that parties intended to do so.152 Further, 
instead of leaving it up to the common law substantive right to rely on the 
seller’s reps and warranties, the parties contractually erased that right and 
replaced it with indemnification as the buyer’s sole remedy.153 Thus, if the 
seller can sell without granting any right to sue over breached reps and 
warranties, then she should be able to grant a limited right to sue and the 
contract, not the external statute of limitations, should determine the 
duration of such substantive right. 
To summarize, where parties specifically address the buyer’s right 
to rely on the seller’s reps and warranties (including the duration of said 
right) within the four corners of the purchase agreement, that right to rely 
should be substantively linked to the survival period.154 Contractual 
survival periods of indemnity rights should be thought of as representing 
a distinct type of substantive right-to-rely that is inextricably tied up in the 
duration of the right.155 
Perhaps the best illustration of the substantive nature of the 
survival period is representation and warranty insurance. Modern 
insurance products offer the opportunity for a buyer and seller to purchase 
insurance, which will cover any breaches of a seller’s reps and warranties 
                                                   
149 See DiVincenzo, supra note 8, at 2. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 RAA Mgmt., LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107, 118 (Del. 2012). 
153 Hovde Acquisition v. Thomas, 2002 WL 1271681, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2002). 
154 Id. 
155 For an example of a case that split the atom of the common law substantive right to 
rely on statements of fact and the new substantive right to indemnity for breaches of representations 
and warranties, see Hovde Acquisition, 2002 WL 1271681, at *7. In that case, the buyer’s sole 
remedy for breaches of representations and warranties had already expired, but the agreement also 
provided that the buyer “may avail itself of any and all rights or remedies available to it either at law 
or equity.” Id. at 5. The court “assume[d], without deciding” that the plaintiff could sue under a 
common law breach of contract theory instead of the contractual right to indemnity based off of the 
contract’s preservation of rights “either at law or equity.” Id. Thus, because the indemnity right was 
not the buyer’s sole remedy, the buyer preserved both the common law right and a limited 
contractual right (but the contractual right had already expired). Id. In that event, the statute of 
limitations provides the duration of the right, but arguably, under the contractual right to indemnity, 
the contract should provide the duration of the right. Id. 
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if the buyer discovers and proves them within the survival period.156 Thus, 
for the payment of a specific premium, the insurance company will grant 
a contractual right.157 This right is functionally equivalent to the seller’s 
grant of indemnification rights that survive for a specific period, yet it is 
unquestioned that it is the terms of the contract, not the statute of 
limitations, which “cut off” a buyer’s right to seek compensation from the 
insurance company.158  
Survival periods and insurance contracts function very similarly. 
In fact, survival periods are a sub-species of insurance product.159 Both 
parties to an insurance contract recognize an underlying risk and they place 
opposite “bets” related to the risk.160 In many cases, the risk relates to the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of an event.161 
One significant factor related to the value of each bet is the time 
period within which each party bets that the event will or will not occur.162 
The price to ensure a building for all flood damages for ninety-nine years 
is significantly more than the price to ensure a building for one year. Each 
of the two bets (the ninety-nine year and the one year) are different risk-
products. Similarly, when a seller sells a business and grants an eighteen-
month survival period, she is selling a specific risk-product. This risk-
product is a substantive right that should be irrelevant to the statute of 
limitations because the duration of the right is also the substance of the 
right.  
In summary, because the source of law for the buyer’s right stems 
not from the common law, but from the contract’s language, which also 
specifically lists how long such a right will last, courts should not allow 
the statute of limitations to modify a substantive right-to-rely. Instead, 
courts should think of indemnification rights and specific survival periods 
as the contractual creation of a substantive right that is tied to a specific 
duration.  
CONCLUSION 
When a buyer and a seller negotiate key provisions in an M&A 
agreement related to reps and warranties, controlling statutes may threaten 
the carefully-balanced allocation of risk between the buyer and seller. This 
risk must be analyzed in light of various states’ laws on whether the statute 
of limitations is a substantive or procedural law for purposes of the Erie 
doctrine. Also, the language the parties use to specify the survival period, 
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whether a state has a borrowing statute, and whether a choice of law 
provision can select another state’s procedural law are all legal “levers” 
that can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Those drafting M&A 
agreements should closely analyze each of these levers.  
Solutions to reduce this risk include creative drafting of liability 
limitations, choice of law provisions, legislative amendments to borrowing 
statutes, and the repeal of controlling statutes. Perhaps the most innovative 
way to reduce risk in this area of law is realizing the distinction between 
the common law right to sue for breaches of reps and warranties and the 
contractual right to indemnity in a modern M&A agreement. 
In the common law scenario, courts would allow a buyer to sue a 
seller when the seller went out of her way to state facts on which the buyer 
relied during the course of the transaction.163 The courts thus created an 
open-ended substantive right for buyers to rely upon sellers’ reps and 
warranties without any internal limits. Instead, the buyer’s right had to be 
externally limited by statutes of limitation and repose.164 
Contrarily, the modern M&A right to indemnification is internally 
limited in such a way that it is inextricably tied to the duration of the 
survival period.165 If courts adopted this distinction between the 
contractual and common law right of reliance, much of the previously-
mentioned complexity would fade because the right to indemnify would 
be a substantive right, for which the forum’s procedural laws would be 
irrelevant. 
 
                                                   
163 See Wilmington & Augusta R.R. v. Ling, 18 S.C. 116, 119 (1882). 
164 See DiVincenzo, supra note 8, at 2. 
165 See Hovde Acquisition v. Thomas, 2002 WL 1271681, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2002). 
